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INTRODUCTION
Corporations and businesses make important decisions every day
that affect their financial viability and market image relative to other
competitors in a particular industry. For those organizations that
produce innovative technologies, the aggregate of the many decisions
made throughout the various stages of development manifests itself
through the final product presented to the marketplace or utilized by
the organization internally. However, as evidenced by the drastic
increase in patent infringement cases brought before U.S. courts each
1
year (there were 2,120 patent suits filed in 1998 and filings increased
2
111% from 1991 to 2000 ), circumstances in which organizations
produce inventions that infringe the legal rights of other entities occur
routinely in the United States.
3
U.S. patent laws influence the decision-making processes for these
technology-producing
organizations
through
the
economic
consequences (the costs of litigating an average patent case are
4
estimated to be one to four million dollars ) and time costs resulting
from actual and potential patent infringement litigation, settlements,
and liability rulings. Yet despite organizations’ knowledge of the
possible legal and business repercussions associated with patent
infringement, a multitude of U.S. court cases addressing this issue
5
continue to arise each year. Accordingly, a proper analysis of the
phenomenon of patent infringement prompts the natural inquiry of
whether firms consciously decide to infringe certain patents as a sound
business strategy or whether such cases arise spontaneously due to
incomplete and careless research of prior art by the infringing firms.
Regardless of what empirical research studies indicate as the most
6
frequent explanation, patent infringement may remain an effective
1. Erik Espe, Friendlier Courts, Higher Stakes Unleash Patent Suits, SILICON
VALLEY/SAN JOSE BUS. J., July 2, 1999, at 1, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/
stories/1999/07/05/story4.html.
2. Pearl Patent Enforcement and Royalties, Ltd., Patent Infringement Lawsuits: By the
Numbers, http://www.pearlltd.com/index6.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2006) (describing the
growth in patent infringement litigation, the increase in case numbers, and the costs involved
with patent infringement).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
4. Julia Huston, Litigating Patent Rights in a Down Economy, 32 MASS. LAW. WKLY.
359 (2003).
5. See Espe, supra note 1; Pearl Patent Enforcement and Royalties, Ltd., supra note 2.
6. See Jennifer Polse, Comment, Holding the Sovereign’s Universities Accountable for
Patent Infringement After Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, 89 CAL. L. REV. 507,
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business strategy for technology-producing firms, even when not
employed willfully, due to the inadequate deterrence function of current
U.S. patent laws.
I. APPLICABILITY OF U.S. PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWS TO
CORPORATIONS
A. Current U.S. Patent Laws Deterring Unintentional Infringement
U.S. patent laws do not explicitly consider the intention of the
alleged infringer in determining whether that entity or person is liable
7
for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 284, 285, and the
8
Consequently, federal courts are not
“doctrine of equivalents.”
explicitly required to consider the fact that a company willfully
produced an infringing technology when determining its liability or the
remedy granted to the plaintiff under a facial interpretation of these
9
aforementioned laws. As a result, the deterrence effect of these patent
laws works to instill a more comprehensive and careful research effort
of prior art by inventors in order to discourage and minimize
unintentional infringement.

519 (2001). Polse states that “most patent infringement suits allege willful infringement.” Id.
Although this demonstrates that most plaintiffs believe a potential patent infringer has
committed willful infringement, many defendants may not have consciously or intentionally
infringed another’s patent, including those parties who settle patent infringement claims,
those who are found not liable for willful infringement by courts, and those who are not
charged with committing willful infringement.
7. But see 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c). It is important to note that these indirect
infringement statutes that protect patent owners against active inducement infringement and
contributory infringement, respectively, do explicitly consider the intention of the alleged
infringer in determining whether that entity is liable for patent infringement. Id. However,
this Comment focuses only on direct infringement by corporations; patent laws deterring
indirect infringement are beyond the scope of this Comment. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET
AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 968–79 (3d ed. 2004) (regarding
patent laws as deterrents of indirect infringement); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,
Inc., 911 F.2d 670 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
8. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950)
(establishing the modern contours of the patent law “doctrine of equivalents”). In this case,
the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he theory on which [the ‘doctrine of equivalents’] is
founded is that ‘if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and
accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name,
form, or shape.’” Id. at 608 (quoting Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125
(1877)).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271; see Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 605. The ‘doctrine of equivalents’ does
not explicitly require courts to consider the intentions of a potential infringer whatsoever.
See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608; see also discussion supra note 8.
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Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, the damages assessed by the jury and/or
judge serve this deterrence function against unintentional infringement
10
and are distinct from those awarded in willful infringement cases,
except when the unintentional infringement is also considered
11
“exceptional” by the court. However, the inability of these patent
12
laws to effectively deter potential infringers from consciously
developing a strategy to infringe upon a patented technology creates a
tangential incentive for firms to develop business plans directed at
violating these laws.
B. Current U.S. Patent Laws Deterring Willful Infringement
Consequently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
begun to recognize the failure of U.S. patent laws and judicial precedent
to explicitly address the business problems created by willful
infringement and has responded with a series of decisions aimed at
13
directly admonishing such action. The pressing need for federal courts
to adopt a strong policy stance against intentional abuses of U.S. patent
laws by willful infringers can be traced back to the creation of the Court
14
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by Congress in 1982. Subsequent to
its formation, the Federal Circuit proceeded to rule that an infringer has
15
a “legal obligation to respect valid patent rights” in a concerted effort
to halt the “widespread disregard of patent rights [that] was
16
undermining the national innovation incentive.”

10. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285; Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v.
Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
11. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285.
12. Id.
13. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342; L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988
F.2d 1117, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 817 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Underwater Devices, Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Afros S.P.A. v. Krauss-Maffei Corp.,
671 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Del. 1987).
14. Knorr-Bremse,
383
F.3d
at
1343;
About
the
Federal
Circuit,
http://www.fedcir.gov/about.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2006); see also Kevin J. Kelly, Placing
the Burden Back Where It Belongs: A Proposal to Eliminate the Affirmative Duty from
Willful Infringement Analyses, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 509, 516 n.51 (2005).
15. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343 (citing Underwater Devices, Inc., 717 F.2d 1380).
16. Id. at 1343 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ADVISORY COMM. ON INDUS.
INNOVATION, FINAL REPORT (1979)); see also William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III,
Understanding and Addressing the Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful Patent
Infringement, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 424–25 (2004) (stating that the “purpose of the [willful
infringement] doctrine [is] . . . to act as a ‘deterrent[] to blatant, blind, willful infringement of
valid patents’”).
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Interestingly, however, the Federal Circuit has provided neither an
express definition for willful infringement, which could be applied to all
patent infringement cases, nor statutory authority, which explicitly
17
prohibits such actions.
Instead, the Federal Circuit derived its
authority to pronounce willful infringement as contrary to U.S. patent
law solely from analogizing that the common law principle disfavoring
an intentional disregard of legal rights should apply not only to civil
18
laws, but patent laws as well. In fact, the only statutory authority
associated with the Federal Circuit’s application of the principle of
willful infringement is in reference to damages and remedies and not the
19
actual wrongful conduct.
This strongly suggests that the judicial
doctrine against willful infringement is fundamentally premised upon
deterrence of intentional infringement through a primarily damages20
based approach, despite suggestions otherwise by the Federal Circuit.
However, adding to the convoluted and tenuous derivation of the
concept of willful infringement by the Federal Circuit is the absence of
any reference to willful or intentional infringement by either the
damages or remedies statutes addressed under 35 U.S.C. § 284 and 35
U.S.C. § 285, respectively. As a result, a judge is entitled to apply § 284
in assessing “increased” damages for all infringement judgments,
21
including willful infringement, and to apply § 285 in awarding
attorneys’ fees because the Federal Circuit has ruled that willful
22
infringement constitutes “exceptional” infringement under the statute.
17. See, e.g., Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342. In confirming that neither the Supreme
Court nor the Federal Circuit has provided an express definition for willful infringement,
which could be applied to all patent infringement cases,
the Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he word ‘willful’ is widely used in the law,
and, although it has not by any means been given a perfectly consistent
interpretation it is generally understood to refer to conduct that is not merely
negligent,” . . . [and] the Court [has cited] conventional definitions such as
“voluntary,” “deliberate,” and “intentional.”
Id. (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Stephanie Pall,
Note, Willful Patent Infringement: Theoretically Sound? A Proposal to Restore Willful
Infringement to Its Proper Place Within Patent Law, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 659, 698 (2006)
(advocating for the adoption of a more “consistent definition of willful patent infringement”).
18. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342 (stating that “[t]he concept of ‘willful
infringement’ is not simply a conduit for enhancement of damages; it is a statement that
patent infringement, like other civil wrongs, is disfavored, and intentional disregard of legal
rights warrants deterrence”).
19. See, e.g., id. at 1342 (stating that the “[r]emedy for willful infringement is founded
on 35 U.S.C. § 284 . . . and 35 U.S.C. § 285”); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285 (2000).
20. See supra note 17.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
22. Id. § 285; Gentry Gallery v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
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Consequently, the relatively confusing and tenuous statutory foundation
for willful infringement liability, damages, and remedies may serve to
support intentional patent infringement as a viable business strategy.
While the only U.S. patent laws to exhibit any deterrence effect
upon potential infringers are the aforementioned § 284 and § 285
statutes, the Federal Circuit has created a more sophisticated test for
23
determining whether willful infringement has occurred. This test is
24
beneficial to both the federal courts and patent lawyers because it adds
substance and certainty to the general judicial philosophy that infringers
who intentionally disregard the patent rights of other inventors should
25
be punished. However, this test is limited in its capabilities because it
Mach. Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 470 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Daniel A. Crane,
Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic
Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 772 n.109 (2002); Thomas L. Irving et al., A Year in
Review: The Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions of 1993, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1404 (1994);
Jared Goff, Comment, The Unpredictable Scope of the Waiver Resulting from the Advice-ofCounsel Defense to Willful Infringement, 1998 BYU L. REV. 213, 216 n.19 (1998).
23. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992). But see Knorr-Bremse, 383
F.3d at 1341; Trading Techs. Int’l v. eSpeed, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 834, 838–39 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
It should be noted that the Federal Circuit and (more recently) the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, have held the traditional judicial
interpretation of one of the elements of the Read factors test to be invalid. See KnorrBremse, 383 F.3d at 1344; Trading Techs. Int’l, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 838–39. More specifically,
the Federal Circuit deviated from the traditional Read holding by ruling that “no adverse
inference that an opinion of counsel was or would have been unfavorable flows from an
alleged infringer’s failure to obtain or produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel.” KnorrBremse, 383 F.3d at 1341; see also Trading Techs. Int’l, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 838. However, the
other elements of the Read holding remain valid law. Read, 970 F.2d at 826–28; see KnorrBremse, 383 F.3d at 1342–43; Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 233, 235 (D.
Conn. 2005).
24. See Michael D. Kaminski, Effective Management of U.S. Patent Litigation (Oct. 26,
2005),
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/2941/Effective%20
Management%20of%20US%20Patent%20Litigation.pdf. This litigation strategy article
addresses the application of the Read factors test by a practicing attorney for use in advising
clients regarding willful patent infringement issues. Id. at 14–19; see also Knorr-Bremse, 383
F.3d at 1343 (“Fundamental to determination of willful infringement is the duty to act in
accordance with law.”). In Knorr-Bremse, the Federal Circuit also noted the efforts of past
courts in “stress[ing] the legal obligation to respect valid patent rights.” Knorr-Bremse, 383
F.3d at 1343 (citing Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 1983)).
25. See David Hricik, Remedies of the Infringer: The Use by the Infringer of Implied and
Common Law Federal Rights, State Law Claims, and Contract to Shift Liability for
Infringement of Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1027, 1056
(stating that the legislative purpose of the Patent Act is to seek “to prevent contributory and
induced infringement and [punish] those who act in intentional disregard of the Patent Act”);
Carol Johns, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.: A Step in
the Right Direction for Willful Infringement, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 69, 84 (2005); Kelly,
supra note 14, at 530 n.157; Joshua Stowell, Willful Infringement and the Evidentiary Value of
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is used by the courts only to classify infringement as intentional and
does not directly serve a deterrence function.
Expanding upon the general judicial doctrine that willfulness is to be
26
determined in “consideration of the totality of the circumstances,” the
Federal Circuit determined that courts should consider nine factors
established in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. that include:
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design
of another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the
other’s patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent
and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was
not infringed; . . . (3) the infringer’s behavior as a party to the
litigation[;] . . . (4) [d]efendant’s size and financial condition[;] (5)
[c]loseness of the case[;] (6) [d]uration of defendant’s
misconduct[;] (7) [r]emedial action by the defendant[;] (8)
[d]efendant’s motivation for harm[; and] (9) [w]hether defendant
27
attempted to conceal its misconduct.
If the judge or jury determines that an infringer’s actions qualify as
willful in consideration of these nine factors, then the judge may
proceed to punish the infringer under the damages and remedies
28
statutes.
II. ANALYSIS OF INADEQUATE PROTECTIONS OF U.S. PATENT
INFRINGEMENT LAWS TO PATENT OWNERS
When considering the current U.S. patent laws prohibiting
infringement, the federal courts’ reliance upon the aforementioned
29
30
statutes as the principal deterrent against potential infringers may
31
prove to be both misguided and ineffective. This is because these
Opinion Letters After Knorr-Bremse v. Dana, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5 (2005) (stating
that “[t]he purposes of finding willful infringement and the subsequent award of enhanced
damages are meant to punish infringers for deliberately breaking the law and to make the
policy statement that patent infringement is ‘disfavored’”).
26. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342.
27. Read, 970 F.2d at 827 (footnotes and citations omitted).
28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285 (2000); Read, 970 F.2d at 826–28.
29. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285.
30. The previously identified federal statutes are characterized as being the principal
deterrent against potential infringers because these are the statutes under which federal
courts derive their authority to assess liability for a party that has committed patent
infringement. The Read factors test is a judicial assessment utilized by courts to determine
whether a party has committed willful patent infringement, and therefore, may serve as an
implicit deterrent against potential infringers, instead of an explicit deterrent. See Read, 970
F.2d at 827.
31. See Johns, supra note 25, at 70–71 (stating that “[n]umerous commentators have
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statutes fail to adequately address and resolve the business innovation
problems that the judicial concept of willful infringement should work
32
The Federal Circuit and Congress have failed to
to combat.
adequately address one of the primary problems for which that court
33
was originally created; the reasons for this failure are outlined here.
A. Inadequate Protections Afforded by Statutory Damages and
Remedies to U.S. Patent Owners
34

35

First, the statutory damages and remedies that the federal courts
may apply to those liable for willful infringement are exactly the same as
the potential damages and remedies that can be applied to all
36
“exceptional” patent infringement cases. These maximum damages
and remedies imposed upon a liable party in both “exceptional” and
willful infringement cases are statutorily limited to “up to three times
37
the amount found or assessed” plus “reasonable attorney fees to the
38
prevailing party.” Therefore, when analyzed from a damages-based
approach, the judicial concept of willful infringement serves a deterrent
function only in the absence of any other action that could be labeled as
39
“exceptional” infringement.
For example, a potential patent infringer may be adequately
deterred from committing willful infringement because the corporation
knows that it may only be assessed unintentional infringement
40
damages if the court finds liability. Conversely, the same potential
patent infringer may not be deterred whatsoever from committing
criticized the modern willfulness doctrine, contending that willfulness charges do not
effectively deter direct copying or punish truly culpable behavior and that the doctrine
creates unhealthy incentives for industry as well as patent lawyers”).
32. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See generally Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717
F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
33. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 16).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
35. Id. § 285.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 284.
38. Id. § 285. The federal courts have interpreted the concept of willful infringement to
constitute “exceptional” infringement for purposes of the application of § 285 to cases
involving willful patent infringement. See Gentry Gallery v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473,
1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Mach. Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 470 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Crane, supra note 22, at 772 n.109; Irving et al., supra note 22, at 1404; Goff, supra note 22, at
216 n.19.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
40. Id. § 285.
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willful infringement if it knows that it may likely be assessed exactly the
41
same amount of “enhanced” liability whether or not the court finds
willful infringement. A scenario illustrative of the second example is
where the corporation knows it is likely to be assessed the maximum
42
statutory amount for “exceptional” infringement liability by the court,
effectively prohibiting the court from assessing any additional damages
for willful infringement because the statutory maximum in damages has
already been assessed. Accordingly, the absence of a separate or
additional statutory penalty for willful infringement equates to an
inability of U.S. patent laws to provide any deterrence for intentional
patent infringers in the many cases where those infringers also commit
43
other acts of “exceptional” infringement.
B. Inadequate Protections Afforded by the Read Factors Test to U.S.
Patent Owners
Furthermore, an additional inadequacy of current U.S. patent laws is
the broad opportunity for alleged infringers to litigate around claims of
willful infringement by arguing that the preponderance of the evidence
44
does not meet the Read factors for willful infringement and that the

41. Id. §§ 284–285.
42. Id.
43. Id. Since neither § 284 nor § 285 expressly address appropriate damages or
remedies for willful infringement, a party found liable for patent infringement by a court
could be assessed the maximum penalty of “three times the amount found or assessed” plus
reasonable attorney fees for any “exceptional” infringement conduct, which does not
constitute willful infringement. If a court has thus already addressed the statutorily allowable
maximum penalty to a party found liable for patent infringement, it may not assess any
additional penalty if it also determines that the same party committed willful infringement in
addition to other acts of “exceptional” infringement. Therefore, the inclusion of an express
provision in both § 284 and § 285 would allow a court to also assess additional penalties for
willful infringement under such circumstances as previously described. See supra notes 34–42
and accompanying text.
44. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Since the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in Read, federal courts are now to apply the Read
factors test while considering the totality of the circumstances of a given case as a tool for
determining whether an alleged infringer has committed willful infringement. Therefore, if a
defendant is able to demonstrate that the preponderance of the evidence (in consideration of
the totality of the circumstances) does not satisfy the Read factors test, then courts should not
find the defendant liable for willful infringement. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Read, 970 F.2d
at 827. However, courts could still determine that the conduct in question constitutes
unintentional (non-willful) infringement. See Pall, supra note 17, at 670–71 (stating that
“[c]onsequently, the Federal Circuit has devoted most of its willful infringement case law to
teasing out the particularities surrounding [the Read factors,]” supporting the ability of patent
attorneys to litigate cases involving willful infringement on the basis of the Read factors).
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infringers’ actions constitute mere unintentional infringement. One
primary problem associated with the Federal Circuit’s standard for
45
willful infringement is its unwillingness to adopt a judicial definition for
46
this concept. Instead of establishing a concise definition delineating
what infringing activities constitute willful infringement, the Federal
Circuit chose to create a non-exhaustive list of factors for courts to
47
consider in determining this type of liability. The absence of a precise
definition for willful infringement contributes to the illegitimacy,
confusion, and uncertainty of this legal concept because alleged
infringers possess an increased opportunity to create doubt as to liability
for an inadequately defined legal claim.
Also, several deficiencies exist regarding the Read factors for willful
48
infringement, which may ease the ability for alleged infringers to
litigate around this test. For example, the list is non-exhaustive, it does
not explicitly dictate the relative weight that courts should give to each
factor, and it does not indicate which or how many factors must be
49
satisfied for willful infringement liability to be assessed. The indefinite
nature of this test allows for arguments against liability to be made
because corporations and patent attorneys will not know what other
factors courts may consider or the type or quantity of evidence
indicating willful infringement that is required.
Additionally, simply because the Federal Circuit has identified these
50
aforementioned nine Read factors as important considerations to
weigh in determining whether an alleged infringer’s conduct constitutes
51
willful infringement, this does not equate to the test being infallible or
the most effective assessment available to the courts. Importantly,
federal courts are required to assess whether willful infringement has
occurred based on “‘the totality of the circumstances’” of each
52
particular case presented.
The three following factors, which the
45. Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
46. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342; see also Pall, supra note 17, at 698.
47. Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 826–28.
50. Id. at 827.
51. Id. at 826–27.
52. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana
Corp. (Knorr-Bremse II), 133 F. Supp. 2d 843, 863 (E.D. Va. 2001)). The relative importance
of the Read factors test and the manner in which federal courts are to apply each of these
factors to patent infringement cases is entirely fact-specific for each individual case, with the
list of factors being non-exhaustive. Id.; Read, 970 F.2d at 827.

WRZESINSKI COMMENT

2007]

PATENT INFRINGEMENT AS A BUSINESS STRATEGY

203

Federal Circuit incorporated from previous federal court decisions into
53
the Read factors test, could be improved to enhance their effectiveness:
(1) “whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith
54
belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed”; (2) “whether the
55
infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another”; and (3)
56
“[r]emedial action by the defendant.”
More specifically, several weaknesses associated with these three
particular Read factors are identified as follows. First, an alleged
infringer can now satisfy the investigation and good-faith requirement
of the first identified Read factor fairly easily after the Knorr-Bremse
and Trading Technologies International v. eSpeed, Inc. rulings by the
Federal Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
57
Illinois, Eastern Division, respectively.
For instance, the Federal
Circuit had previously interpreted this investigation and good-faith
requirement to impose an “affirmative duty” upon a potential infringer
to “seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the
58
initiation of any possible infringing activity.”
59
Under this formerly imposed duty, however, a corporation that
may have sought to willfully infringe a patent could have hired a patent
attorney for legal advice, and, in turn, failed to adhere to that advice
since corporations do not have an obligation to follow the counsel of
every hired attorney. Likewise, attorneys cannot force a client
corporation to follow his or her advice and adhere to the law. Under
such a scenario, the corporation’s actions would have easily satisfied the
60
previously enforced requirements of the first identified Read factor, yet
the corporation may still have decided to engage in willful infringement.

53. Read, 970 F.2d at 827; see Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Intra Corp. v. Hamar Laser Instruments, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1420, 1439 (E.D. Mich.
1987).
54. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text
for a qualification of this particular Read factor.
55. Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
56. Id.
57. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1337; Trading Techs. Int’l v. eSpeed, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d
834 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
58. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343; Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen
Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.,
988 F.2d 1117, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Andrew Corp. v. Beverly Mfg. Co., 415 F. Supp. 2d 919,
927 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
59. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343.
60. Read, 970 F.2d at 827.

WRZESINSKI COMMENT

204 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1
61

Interestingly, the federal courts have recently retreated from this
62
formerly imposed “affirmative duty” and have subsequently increased
the ease with which an alleged infringer may now satisfy the
investigation and good-faith requirement of the first identified Read
63
factor. This recent change in the law is significant because now “no
adverse inference that an opinion of counsel was or would have been
unfavorable flows from an alleged infringer’s failure to obtain or
64
produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel.” In fact, this deviation
evidences a direct contradiction by the Federal Circuit in that any
deterrence effect, which may have once existed under this Read factor,
65
appears to have vanished.
Furthermore, although it may be more difficult for a corporation to
argue against liability under the second identified factor, a potential
willful infringer could still have success demonstrating that it did not
66
deliberately copy an idea or design. For instance, a corporation could
deny deliberately copying a patent and instead argue that it “made a
good faith effort to design around the patented invention” as a
67
legitimate defense to this element of willful infringement.
Also, a
61. See id. at 828 (stating that the “affirmative duty normally entails obtaining advice of
legal counsel although the absence of such advice does not mandate a finding of willfulness”).
But see Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345 (stating that “[a]lthough there continues to be ‘an
affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of
others,’ . . . the failure to obtain an exculpatory opinion of counsel shall no longer provide an
adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such opinion would have been
unfavorable”). See generally Steven C. Cherny et al., 2004 Patent Law Decisions of the
Federal Circuit, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 941, 1152 (2005); Johns, supra note 25, at 86 (stating that
“[t]he finder of fact will no longer be able to presume malicious intent based on an accused
infringer’s failure to consult counsel or claim privilege”); Harold C. Wegner, Developments in
Patent Law 2004, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 24 (2004).
62. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1337; Trading Techs. Int’l, 431 F. Supp. 2d 834.
63. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
64. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341; see also Read, 970 F.2d at 816; Trading Techs. Int’l,
431 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
65. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344; Trading Techs. Int’l, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 834; see
also Johns, supra note 25, at 87 (stating that “[t]ime will tell just how safe competitors are
from the adverse inference in light of Knorr-Bremse IV. The court left much of willfulness
doctrine, and its resulting uncertainty, intact” and emphasizing the uncertainty surrounding
the change in judicial interpretation of this Read factor); Harold A. Borland, Comment, The
Affirmative Duty to Exercise Due Care on Willful Patent Infringement Cases: We Still Want It,
6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 176, 185 (2005) (stating that “there is no evidence that the
imposition of the duty and the corresponding threat of enhanced damages actually has any
effect of deterrence,” which directly contradicts the Federal Circuit’s aim of deterring willful
infringement).
66. Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
67. See Edwin H. Taylor & Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposal to Shore Up the
Foundation of Patent Law that the Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
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corporation could claim that it developed an invention independently
without deliberately copying another corporation’s design, as many
technology-producing firms conduct research simultaneously in the
same scientific fields.
Although independent invention is not a valid defense to
unintentional patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271, it would be a
perfectly effective defense to willful infringement under the Read
factors test because one of the elements takes into consideration
“whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of
68
another.”
Additionally, a potential willful infringer attempting to
circumvent the willful infringement test could argue that it merely
combined several elements into an invention that is similar to other
69
patents, but did not deliberately copy any designs or ideas. Hence,
under these aforementioned possibilities, a corporation’s actions could
70
satisfy the requirements of the second identified Read factor, yet the
corporation could still choose to engage in willful infringement.
Moreover, a potentially infringing corporation could also satisfy the
71
third identified factor for indicating willful infringement, which would
weigh in favor of the defendant corporation in assessing willful
infringement liability. Specifically, the Read factor of “[r]emedial action
by the defendant” is the previously identified third factor for a court to
consider in determining whether a defendant is liable for willful
infringement that could be improved for an overall increased
72
effectiveness of the Read test. This factor includes an assessment of a
potential infringer’s conduct after the plaintiff has filed a suit for willful
73
infringement.

L.J. 721, 727 (1998) (stating that a reduction in exposure to patent liability “can occur through
licensing or designing around the patent”); see also Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823
F.2d 1538, 1546–47 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
68. Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Intra Corp. v.
Hamar Laser Instruments, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1420, 1439 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
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75

Both the Federal Circuit and federal district courts have only
considered conduct by a defendant to a lawsuit that has changed from
76
the status quo in a manner adverse to the plaintiff as being detrimental
77
evidence under the aforementioned third Read factor. An example of
remedial conduct where a federal court has found a change from the
status quo in a manner adverse to the plaintiff involved a case where
approximately eighty percent of the defendant corporation’s total
78
infringing sales occurred after the plaintiff filed suit. Another such
case involved a defendant corporation that assigned two patents at issue
in the suit to a subsidiary in an effort to avoid liability after the
79
infringement suit was filed.
Accordingly, in order to successfully satisfy the requirements of this
third Read factor, a corporation could simply argue that it has complied
with the principle of a court issued stay of injunction by preserving the
80
status quo of its potentially infringing actions. Such a claim, if argued
successfully, would absolve a defendant corporation from liability when
considering only the “remedial action” third element because courts
follow the generally accepted principle that a defendant’s preservation
of the status quo during a stay of injunction is a valid defense to an
81
Therefore, current U.S.
indication of willfully infringing conduct.
patent laws afford inadequate protections to patent owners due to the
82
ineffective deterrent function of the relevant statutes and corporations’
83
ability to navigate around the Read factors test in an effort to seek
increased profits.

74. Bott, 807 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
75. Afros S.P.A. v. Krauss-Maffei Corp., 671 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Del. 1987). In this case,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware ruled that the defendant’s willful
infringement of the plaintiff’s patent was to be imputed to its wholly owned subsidiary. Id. In
reaching its decision, the district court considered the fact that the defendant assigned two of
its patents to a subsidiary after the lawsuit had been filed. Id. at 1460.
76. Bott, 807 F.2d at 1573.
77. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
78. Bott, 807 F.2d at 1573.
79. Afros, 671 F. Supp. at 1459–60.
80. See Bott, 807 F.2d at 1573.
81. Id.
82. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 284–285 (2000); see also Mark A. Lemley & Raggesh K. Tangri, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1111 (2003) (stating that “[t]he fact that damages in many patent
cases will be limited to a reasonable royalty creates problems of deterrence”); Borland, supra
note 65.
83. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see supra notes 43–44
and accompanying text.
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III. PROPOSAL FOR CHANGES TO CURRENT U.S. PATENT
INFRINGEMENT LAWS FOR UNIVERSAL FEDERAL JUDICIAL
ADOPTION
Based upon the previous analysis identifying the many weaknesses
of current U.S. patent laws in effectively deterring corporations from
profiting by committing willful infringement, new changes in these laws
are needed to more successfully promote the intentions of Congress as
84
well as the Federal Circuit’s intentions to inhibit this phenomenon.
Accordingly, this author proposes three distinct actions, which should
be taken by these federal bodies in order to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of U.S. patent laws in deterring willful infringement by
corporations. This three-part proposal includes: (1) adoption of a
precise legal definition for willful patent infringement by the Federal
Circuit; (2) creation by Congress of more stringent patent damages
statutes, which apply specifically to cases of willful infringement; and (3)
adoption by the Federal Circuit of a test or standard for identifying
willful infringement, which is stricter and more effective than the
85
current Read factors test.
First, the Federal Circuit has consciously avoided the creation and
adoption of a precise definition for the legal concept of willful patent
86
infringement for reasons that are not entirely clear.
The Federal
Circuit’s creation of an express definition for willful infringement would
improve the existing patent laws in this area by enhancing the legitimacy
of this legal concept, providing clear notice of the law to potential
87
infringers, and clarifying and solidifying the legal foundation and origin
of this concept. However, if the Federal Circuit does not believe that it
possesses the responsibility for drafting and adopting a legal definition
for willful patent infringement, then Congress should take it upon itself
to enact a statutory patent law that provides such an explicit definition
for the courts to follow.
84. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 16); Underwater Devices,
Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
85. Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
86. See, e.g., Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342; see also Kaminski, supra note 24.
87. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342. It should be noted, as previously mentioned in
this Comment, that the Federal Circuit derives its authority to pronounce willful infringement
as contrary to U.S. patent law solely from analogizing that the common law principle
disfavoring an intentional disregard of legal rights should apply not only to civil laws, but
patent laws as well. Therefore, adoption by the Federal Circuit of an explicit definition for
the concept of willful patent infringement would create an identifiable origin for this concept
within the field of patent law. See supra Part I.
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Second, Congress should enact statutory patent laws to delineate
88
effective damages and remedies, specifically for cases where courts find
the defendant liable for willful patent infringement. Most importantly,
such statutes should include provisions that allow courts to assess
89
damages for willful infringement in addition to damages assessed for
any other finding of patent infringement liability or other civil liabilities.
If courts possessed the ability to assess damages for cases involving
willful infringement liability in addition to those assessed for any other
liabilities, as this proposal suggests, then patent infringement laws would
be much more effective at performing a deterrence function against
willful infringement.
This proposal differs from the current patent infringement damages
and remedies statutes in that the current statutes only allow for a court’s
assessment of liability for up to three times the base liability found plus
reasonable attorneys’ fees for all instances of “exceptional”
90
infringement.
Accordingly, in cases where the court finds the
defendant liable for both willful infringement and another act of
“exceptional” infringement, the court is statutorily limited to assessing
only up to three times the base liability found plus reasonable attorneys’
fees because willful infringement is considered an act of “exceptional”
91
infringement by courts.
However, under this new proposal, courts
would possess the ability to assess additional damages for infringement
cases where the court finds both willful infringement and other acts of
“exceptional” infringement. An additional modification to improve the
deterrence function of the patent statutes against willful infringement
could also include an increased maximum monetary penalty beyond
92
three times the base liability found, which courts may assess in such
circumstances. Therefore, this proposal would increase the deterrence
effect of patent laws against willful infringement through enhanced

88. A modified remedies statute should include a specific provision to award reasonable
attorneys’ fees where a court finds willful infringement, despite the fact that the current
remedies statute already awards such a remedy, in order for the modified remedies statute to
serve an effective deterrence function against willful infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 285
(2000).
89. Courts should be allowed to assess only additional damages, and not additional
remedies, in cases where the defendant is found liable for willful infringement because it is
not appropriate or equitable for a court to assess any remedy in addition to that of reasonable
attorneys’ fees, which are already assessed where “exceptional” infringement is found. See id.
90. Id. §§ 284–285.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 284.
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statutory penalties, which allow for the assessment of both additional
and increased maximum monetary awards.
Third, the Federal Circuit should adopt a test or standard for
identifying willful infringement that is stricter and more effective than
93
the current Read factors test.
The adoption of such a test by the
Federal Circuit would contribute to enhancing the deterrence effect of
U.S. patent laws against willful infringement in several ways. A stricter
factors test for identifying acts of willful infringement would decrease
the opportunity for and freedom with which potential willful infringers
may attempt to modify their infringing conduct and present legal
defenses for patent infringement, which they knew to be willful.
Moreover, such action by the Federal Circuit would increase the
effectiveness of willful infringement laws by instituting a shift from a
94
remedies-based approach to a facially prohibitive approach.
Accordingly, U.S. patents laws would deem specific acts of willfully
infringing conduct illegal, regardless of the impact that the various
patent remedy statutes would have on deterring, identifying, and
penalizing willful infringement.
For example, the Federal Circuit could initiate such a shift in
approach by modifying the three previously identified Read factors for
courts to consider in willful infringement liability cases for improved
95
effectiveness.
The first of these factors considers “whether the
infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent protection, investigated
the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid
96
or that it was not infringed.” This first factor could become more
effective by instead requiring courts to consider only whether the
infringer knew of the plaintiff’s patent protection. Such a change would
make this factor stricter by eliminating the good-faith belief arguments,
which potential willful infringers may attempt to construct.
Additionally, a similarly effective change to the second identified
Read factor could involve deleting the word “deliberately” from the
requirement that courts consider “whether the infringer deliberately
97
copied the ideas or design of another.”
This modification would
93. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
94. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 763, 791 (2002) (stating that “[o]ptimal deterrence is achieved when the penalties
are high and the enforcement costs are low because this produces the most compliance at the
lowest cost to society”). See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285.
95. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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increase the effectiveness of the second element by indicating that a
copied idea or design is intrinsically “deliberately” copied. Even if a
defendant corporation attempted to provide the defense that its idea or
design was independently derived, such an argument would not be
covered under this second element because an independently created
idea or design could be construed by courts to not constitute an act of
copying.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Federal Circuit could
create a standard that is stricter than the current third identified Read
98
factor.
This third factor delineates that courts must weigh the
“[r]emedial action by the defendant” with an emphasis to be placed on
whether the defendant’s actions deviated from the status quo after the
99
patent infringement suit was filed.
In order to increase the
effectiveness of this factor, the Federal Circuit should eliminate the
corollary, which contemplates whether the defendant’s actions deviated
100
from the status quo after filing of the suit.
Such a change would
greatly benefit plaintiffs to willful infringement suits because it would
prevent defendants who successfully demonstrate that their status quo
did not change from being absolved from liability under the third
101
element. Accordingly, these defendants who were pocketing the same
high level of profits prior to and after the willful infringement suit filing
would benefit from a valid defense for no liability under the current
102
third factor standard.
Conversely, the modified third factor would
weigh against the defendant for a failure to take appropriate remedial
action while maintaining a high profit level.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, as a result of the ineffectiveness of current U.S. patent
laws in deterring and penalizing patent infringers, particularly
corporations, from committing willful infringement and potentially
utilizing such actions as an integral part of a business model, new
changes in these laws are demanded in order to realize the goals of
Congress and the Federal Circuit for preventing willful infringement.
The most efficient and forceful mechanism for instituting these greatly
needed modifications consists of a three-pronged proposal, which
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
See id.; Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
See Bott, 807 F.2d at 1573–74.
See id.
See Read, 970 F.2d at 827; Bott, 807 F.2d at 1573.
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includes: (1) adoption of a precise legal definition for willful patent
infringement by the Federal Circuit; (2) action by Congress to create
more stringent patent damages statutes, which apply specifically to cases
of willful infringement; and (3) adoption by the Federal Circuit of a test
or standard for identifying willful infringement, which is stricter and
more effective than the current Read factors test. The benefits of this
proposal include an enhanced deterrent effect against corporations from
committing willful infringement when these entities believe they could
profit from such actions and detrimental financial consequences for
those corporations who continue to engage in willful infringement
without deference to the potential repercussions. Consequently, federal
adoption of such a proposal would initiate a return to the U.S.
government’s promotion of a sense of true innovative progress in
American corporations and simultaneously spurn notions of free-riding,
which have been adopted by some technology-producing corporations.
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